Scientific researchers traditionally have held that the use of data represents a test of hypotheses or theories. Social psychologist William McGuire has developed a contrary position, arguing that instead of testing hypotheses and theories, research merely specifies their limitations, generality, and assumptions. McGuire's contextualism suggests that all hypotheses and theories, even contradictory ones, are both true and false in different situations. Such an approach implies a partial resolution to the empirical/humanistic debate over mass media effects research. As an empiricist, McGuire maintains that data are needed to evaluate theory; as a humanist, he holds that data do not represent the only source of knowledge. Mass media researchers have long used strategies consistent with contextualism, and it does not necessarily imply numerous and dramatic changes in methods of those who have recognized the transitional and processual nature of mass communication. It does suggest relatively profound changes in the interpretations researchers place on empirical evidence, however. Because of the complexity of social phenomena, time and space often will limit the applicability of research findings. Therefore, researchers of media effects should exercise caution in the answers they offer to questions of applied social importance. A 7-page reference list is appended. (FL) *********************************************************************** * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made * * from the original document. * *********************************************************************** 
LMPLICATIONS OF A CONTEXTUALIST APPROACH TO MEDIA-EFFECTS RESEARCH
During much of the history of research into the effects of mass communication, several controversies have existed. Critical and other humanistic scholars often have criticized empirical research foi: an inattention to social context (for example, Slack & Allor, 1983) and for an authoritarian belief that empiricist verification represents the only source of truth (for example, Ewen, 1983; Thayer, 1983) . Empirical researchers have responded by saying they include measurable proxies for context, such as socioeconomic status, in research designs. They also tend to claim that without empirical test, theory is polemic (for example, Stevenson, 1983) .1
In addition, members of the general public have claimed that important media effects of various sorts occur (Roberts & Maccoby, 1985) , but social scientists who have studied these claims often have reported a failure to corroborate them (for example, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) .
Even when research generally has demonstrated effects, such as the impact of exposure to televised violence upon aggressive behavior in young people, media influence often appears weak (Kenny, 1984) . McGuf.re's version of a theory of knowledge, contextualism (McGuire, 1983; , mairtains that scientists should change the way they view the relationship of a hypothesis and empirical data. They should make an a priori assumption that all theories and hypotheses, even contradictory ones, are both true and false, 3 in different situations. Therefore, instead of testing theories and hypotheses, research specifies their limitations, generalit , and assumptions.
Such an approach implies a partial resolution to the empirical/humanistic debate over research. As an empiricist, McGuire maintains that data are needed to evaluate theory. Like the humanistic scholars, he does not claim that empirical data represent the only source of knowledge.
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His contextualism also suggests a way of resolving popular intuition and research evidence. Popular opinion about the media is not wrong, but correct only in an unknown range of situations.
Social psychology long has influenced mass-communication research.
McGuire's epistemological ideas also likely will affect mass-communication researchers, probably soon after they become more-widely adopted in social psychology. This paper will summarize both contextualism generally and
McGuire's version. Writing in The Journal of Communication, psychologists Marianthi Georgoudi and Ralph Rosnow (1985a) argued that contextualism is arising from a revolutionary metamorphosis in social science. It will be argued here that media-effects researchers long have used empirical strategies consistent with it, and decades-old conceptions of mass communication as a transaction between sender and receiver are but a few evolutionary steps removed from it. The present paper also will discuss certain implications of contextualism, particularly of McGuire's version, for the way media-effects researchers view and interpret their work, for 3 the methods they use, and for the answers they provide to questions of applied social concern.
Contextualism American pragmatists such as Charles Pierce and William James provided the roots of contextualism. The formal contextualist world view, as discussed by Pepper (1942) and applied to social psychology by Georgoudi and Rosnow (1985b) , begins with the root metaphor for science of the transitory historical event. Events are historical not in the common usage of the word (i.e., in the past), but because they are changing continously and point both to past antecedents and to future outcomes. Change itself is viewed as categorical; therefore, knowledge always must remain provisional and relative (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985b) . Researchers Ire cautioned against trying to explain phenomena with reference to covering laws and static axiomatic systems, and contextualism implies an acceptance of pure chance and intentional human action. Therefore, researchers should specify carefully the contexts in Which they make claims for kncwledge (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985b) . Contextualists do not ignore, however, "the possibility that some forms of change are much slower than others so as to
give the impression of timeless structures or qualities in the events examined" (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985b, p. During the last dozen years, the term conextualism has appeared not only in the literatures of communication (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985a) and of social and personality psychology (Georgoudi & Rosnow 1985b; Mancuso, 1977; McGuire, 1983 McGuire, , 1985 Sarbin, 1977; Veroff, 1983) , but also in cognitive psychology (Jenkins, 1974) . In addition, prominent psychologists such as 4 Lee Cronbach (1975 ), Kenneth Gergen (1973 ), and Donald Campbell (1973 have adopted positions substantively consistent with it.
Although differences exist among contextualists, they tend to share certain themes. Contextualists have developed a supposedly nonmechanistic view of psychology, as opposed to the machine-like analogy of the field embriced by earlier, positivist-influenced social scientists (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985b) . Mechanism had its roots in physical scientists such as Newton, and psychologists using it viewed the human being as analogous to a push-and-pull machine that responded to stimuli in its environment (Rosnow, 1981) .
In contrast, McGuire and others with similar views:
...all seem to emphasize the active, intentional nature of human behavior; to view the human subject as actively engaged in the construction of social knowledge; to treat the scientist as participant rather than as 'detached observer'; to urge the use of methods to uncover the diachronic structure and intentional nature of social phenomena; and to treat these phenomena as parts of a wider sociohistorical context. (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985b, pp. 6-7) McGuire's Theory of Knowledge This section contains a summary and interpretation of McGuire's contextualism, based upon two recent publications (McGuire, 1983; .
He does not cite other contextualist formulations, but uses the term because it emphasizes that empirical data are "an aid for discovering contexts in which a given theory leads to useful insights and contexts in which it is misleading" (McGuire, 1985, p. 573 (McGuire, 1983, p. 27) . A scientist also should construct theory suggesting an opposite hypothesis, such as a prediction that exposure to mediated violence may have a cathartic effect, inhibiting aggression (Feshbach, 1961) .
Because of this, contextualism suggests that research methods with logical empiricism, structural-equation models, in which the researcher imposes theory on data, also are recommended. McGuire calls for a systems style of research, using multiple and bidirectional causal paths, to approximate the complexity of the real world. Georgoudi & Rosnow (1985a) argue that contextualism represents a break with the mechanistic influence of physical scieace on social science.
This change is needed in part because of artifacts present in research with human subjects, such as demand cnaracteristics. Contextualism does not necessarily require a total abandonment of mechanistic influence, however.
In the future of social psychology, for example, McGuire predicts the emergence of a theory "based on the broader information-processing conceptualizations that have evolved from the computer analogy, but augmented by a fuller appreciation of motivational aspects and of memory limitations and costs" (McGuire, 1985, p. 586) .
McGuire also claims (1983) that contextualism is as much a philosophy for physical as for social scientists:
The contextualist proposition that empirical confrontation involves hypothesis discovery and clarification rather than hypothesis testing is not a prescription needed only by the social and behavioral sciences because of their purportedly mote complicated or value-laden subject matter, or their less manipulable or more hidden variables, or their peculiarly unpredictable or reactive units of observation, or whatever. Rather, for the physical scientist as well as the social scientist, empirical confrontation is and ought to be a discovery procedure to make explicit hidden assumptions more tha,.: as a testing procedure to discover if the original hypothesis is or is not true. One might conclude that we are in the midst of a contexLualist scientific revolution a la Thomas Kuhn (1962) , in which assumptions about important questions and appropriate methods change radically. In some ways, however, contextualism represents a more-limited evolutionary step for media-effects researchers.
During much of the history of mass-communication studies, researchers have used diachronic methods, which involve the study of changes over time.
For example, Paul Lazarsfeld used panel studies to look at media influence on voting intentions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Caudet, 1948) and upon consumer behavior (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) in some of the earliest media-effects research.
Experimentation, popular with media-effects researchers during the 1960s, has declined in usage since (Rogers & Chaffee, 1983 Bybee, 1978) . Although the oneshot, cross-sectional survey perhaps is the most-common method used to study media effects, increasing emphasis on the importance of process has been evident.
Contextualism's axiom that the truth of hypotheses varies with different people and in different situations and its emphasis on the intentional nature of human behavior have been at least implicit in the mass-communications literature f4r virtually as long as researchers have 9 measured effects. At different points in the past, according to standard media-effects histories (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1975; Bauer, 1965) , models assuming powerful and uniform and those assuming limited effects dominated academic discussions of the mass media. (Bauer, 1964, p. 320) .
In The Effects of Mass Communication, a well-known summary of the limited-effects position, Joseph Klapper (1961) recognized that powerful media effects may occur under some conditions, an idea that many also have overlooked (Roberts & Maccoby, 1985) .
The limited-effects model also is consistent with contextualist For example, the extent that exposure to television violun.
.Lbutes to aggressiv behavior in children may depend upon how realistic the child believes the content to be, a psychological intervening variable, and also upon the socioeconomic status of the child's family, a structural factor.
Such approaches imply that researchers must use more-complex methods and that science potentially can isolate the very specific and sometimes-rare situations in which important media effects occur.
Based upon experience with research, such as that conducted to determine if violent television content contributes to aggressive behavior, one prominent mass-communications theorist (Tichenor, 1981) If and when such conditions are specified, the answer to the question 'Which theory is correct?' will become increasingly complex. Also, however, the state of knowledge will be much more complete.
Specification of complexity is a common outcome of the pursuit of knowledge. (Tichenor, 1981, pp. 26-27) Tichenor, however, stops short of proclaiming all hypotheses and theories empirically valid, a priori.
Mass-communications researchers also have emphasized context. Social scientists such as Lazarsfeld have been called contextual social psychologists (Pettigrew, 1981) . The contextualists differ from both experimental and symbolicinteractionist social psychologists because of the contextual group's "consistent simultaneous use of individual and social variables in both its theory and research" (Pettigrew, 1981, p. 308 Chaffee, 1972; Tims & Masland, 1985) . Studies such as these generally attempt to look at mass communication as a part of, and sometimes as an influence on, people's overall communication behavior.
Contextualism describes the scientist as an active participant in knowledge construction, rather than as a detached observer, leading to a rejection of the traditional dichotomy of basic and applied research (Geourgoudi & Rosnow, 1985a ). Many mediaeffects investigators will not quarrel with such a position. Funding for effects research generally has resulted from public concerns about mass communications rather than from theoretical considerations (McLeod & Reeves, 1980) . Effects investigators often have not seen themselves as pure scientists seeking to uncover knowledge without considering its practical implications. As a result, they often have participated in policy debates by writing articles for popular magazines, testifying before legislative bodies, and appearing on publicaffairs television shows.
Investigators recently have recognized the importance of historical 12 context in interpreting data. For example, many now argue that certain limited-effects phenomena occurred only in the 1940s (Rogers & Chaffee, 1983) , before television became important. The media-dependency model (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976 ) makes certain contextual, historical predictions, for example that media will have a high potential for effects during times of structural instability in society. Others have said that in an era of rapid innovation of communications technology, current mediaeffects theories soon may become as dated as the limited-effects model.
Implications for Future Media-Effects Methods
To assert that all hypotheses are true, but only some instances, implies that much research should involve a search for what statisticians call interaction, which occurs when the impact of one thing on another depends upon one or more additional factor. Interactions can lead to inconsistent findings across studies (Downs & Rocke, 1981) , 6 for example when social or historical contexts modify the effect of mass communication on people. They also can operate within a study, ...hen people with different motives for using the mass media respond differently to their messages, for instance. Interactions represent qualifications to general scientific laws, leading social scientists away from studying shared characteristics of all people or social groups and toward the humanist's concern with the uniqueness of individual people and societies.
Students of mass-media effects often complain about the conflicting evidence available concerning virtually all widely researched questions.
One can easily locate published research indicating that exposure to televised violence either increases and defuses aggressive behavior in 13 you-1g people, for instance. Such inconsistency doubtlessly has contributed to the recent shift of interest among graduate students away from effects research (see Wilhoit, 1984 , for evidence of this trend). Social-science stuilents may feel, along with Lave and March (1975, The presence of heteroscedasticity, unequal dependent-variable variances at different levels of an independent variable, suggests neglected interaction 14 equality of variances among different groups, is consistent with, although not necessarily conclusive of, an assumption of lack of unidentified interaction within a study (Perry, 1985 Problems can arise when the number of variables interacting with say, media exposure, is quite large (Downs & Rocke, 1981 when they occur, are trivial, in terms of explained variability.
Certain process models offer a means of dealing with excessive interaction. In this regard, Downs and Rocke (1981) recommend simulation models discussel by Cyert and March (1963) , Crecine (1969) , and Larkey (1979) .
Such techniques involve tracking a process through a number of steps, which represent contingent conditions affecting the outcome of the process.
Contextualism differs from the ideas of most modern media-effects One can abandon viewing research as testing whether theories and'hypotheses are true without eliminating statistical tests, however.
Despite their name, they remain useful in indicating whether, for example, an observed correlation between exposure to televised news and publicaffairs knawledge.could have resulted from sampling error. Viewing all hypotheses as true a priori also suggests that researchers can infer media effects from analyses of media content, contrary to established social-science doctrine (for example Wimmer & Dominick, 1983) . One can even assume that certain effects occur, based upon descriptions of media structures, as critical scholars sometimes are accused of doing. Additional research, however, still is needed to specify how general such effects are. It also is needed to identify the conditions in which different effects occur.
For example, the recent New International Information Order debate has featured complaints by spokespersons tor the developing nations that the Western news agencies cover these areas of the world in a spars.1 and negative, unrepresentative manner (Masmoudi, 1979 Researchets should develop conceptual deficitions carefully, perhaps by using persons who have specialized training in this, analytic philosophers (Alston, 1985 (Cronbach, 1975) .
Contextualism also means, obviously, that mediaeffects researchers need to make additional efforts to include measures of context in their work.
To an extent, previous researchers (for example, Chaffee & McLeod, 1973) In at least one sense, attention to context can have a revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, impact on the way media-effects researchers view their work. If context cannot be fully represented by using antecedent or intervening variables, as Slack and Allor (1983) and Georgoudi and Rosnow (1985a) argue, it strikes at one of the most-important assumptions mediaeffects and other social scientists researchers have made, that their theories, in principle, can be generalized across time and place. In this case, researchers need to recognize that they share a great deal more with historians and with humanists than they have thought previously (Cronbach, 1975) . Media research may be as much an idiographic as a nomothetic field.
Perhaps the most important implic&tion of contextualism for mediaeffects research is one of modesty. Due to the importance of changes in historical and social context, researchers can no longer expect to develop invariant laws that apply across time and space. The most one can hope for is contextually qualified laws.
To the extent that unforeseen, uncontrolled, or umeasurable outside factors modify media effects, social scientists ability to predict the future is limiteA severely. Cronbach (197f; ) put it well:
Once we attend to interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity. However far we carry our analysis--to third order or fifth order or any other--untested interactions of a still higher order can be envisioned. (p. 119)
Applied Considerations
Contextualism has clear implications for the way researchers answer questions of social concern. Without mentioning contextualism, Donald Campbell (1974) offers advice consistent with contextualist epistemology of social science "as history" (Gergen, 1973, p. 309) . "The job of the methodologist for the experimenting society is not to say what is to be done, but rather to say what has been done" (Campbell, 1973, p. 72 2 Scholars associated with both the critical (Gitlin, 1981) and empirical (Noelle-Neumann, 1983 ) schools have at times sided with popular intuition and challenged certain limited-effects interpretations of data, however.
3 This paper uses the terms true and false, with reference to a theory, in a relative rather than absolute sense. This is consisteat with McGuire. 4 It is no accident that bith McGuire (1985, p. 575 ) and Thayer (1983, p. 90) , who takes a human1:7tic position, quote Blake: "Everything possible to be believ'd is an image lf truth."
5 These historical interpret:Itions are not accepted universally. For instance, Wartella and Reeves (1985) challenged them with reference to research concerniqg media and children.
